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Introduction  
Prior to Operation DESERT STORM, U.S. military personnel were not trained or equipped to fight 
in a chemical warfare (CW) environment. According to a 1991 General Accounting Office (GAO) 
report, “many soldiers have not been adequately prepared to survive and sustain operational 
missions in a chemical environment.”[1] The U.S. military drawdown of the 1990s made 
preparation to fight CW-armed adversaries even less of a priority. While U.S. forces remained 
unprepared to fight in a chemical environment, the likelihood of operating in that type environment 
increased. The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review stated, “the threat or use of chemical or 
biological weapons is a likely condition of future warfare, including in the early stages of war to 
disrupt U.S. operations and logistics.”[2] The military was faced with a situation where it would 
likely fight in an environment where it was ill-equipped and ill-trained to win. To ensure continued 
mission success in an evolving threat environment, the U.S. military must organize, equip, and 
train its forces to carry out operations in a CW environment.[3]  
In response to this changing threat environment, the U.S. Air Force developed its C-CW 
CONOPS, approved in January 2002. The C-CW CONOPS is a more flexible system, based on a 
variety of studies, allowing for localized areas of maximum wear of protective equipment and a 
quicker restoration of combat operations. This new system, however, has received a great deal of 
criticism in the defense community, especially from the Army. The crux of the debate concerns 
the persistence of chemical agents. The Air Force believes that new studies show that chemical 
agents, such as VX, pose a much more limited hazard than Army doctrine indicates.  
The other services should closely examine the work the Air Force has done developing is new 
plan to fight in a chemical environment. While most Army and Navy forces are maneuver forces, 
a significant portion of their combat capability relies on fixed bases. At these fixed bases, the Air 
Force C-CW CONOPS can help improve their ability to support forward combat operations. The 
Army and Navy can apply many of the tenets with little difficulty, since Air Force planners have 
built a plan that can be applied flexibly to many operating locations with a minimum of additional 
equipment.  
The Threat Environment  
The CW threat is not likely to go away. In fact, due to its conventional warfare superiority, the 
U.S. military faces increasing proliferation challenges. The January 2001 Secretary of Defense 
report, Proliferation: Threat and Response, states: “Key states of proliferation concern are 
continuing to try to acquire and develop dangerous weapons… NBC [nuclear, biological, and 
chemical] weapons increasingly are viewed as asymmetric means to counter the West’s superior 
conventional military capabilities.”[4] As U.S. conventional strength grows, so does the 
attractiveness of attacking U.S. military bases and units with chemical weapons.  
This type of thinking about the CW threat is not new. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin introduced 
his Defense Counterproliferation Initiative in 1993. His October 1993 “Report on the Bottom-Up 
Review,” stated: “More than 25 nations either have or are attempting to acquire weapons of mass 
destruction—nuclear, biological, or chemical. In most areas where U.S. forces could potentially 
be engaged, our likely adversaries already possess chemical and biological weapons.”[5] Since 
then, the chemical weapons threat to U.S. troops has grown.  
The Air Force Response 
Approved in February 2002, the C-CW CONOPS is a dramatic departure from the old concept of 
operations in a chemical warfare environment. Under the old system, any chemical attack was 
assumed to cause a base-wide contamination problem, resulting in long-term, base-wide Mission 
Oriented Protective Posture 4 (MOPP 4) wear, which quickly degraded operations. [6] The C-CW 
CONOPS emphasizes restoration of combat operations while promising to improve combatant 
safety.  
The C-CW CONOPS reflects a new way of thinking about “the ability to survive and operate,” 
emphasizing the “operate” portion, as opposed to the previous emphasis on the “survive” portion. 
It incorporates into one coherent framework the change in Air Force thinking about likely threats 
to airfield operations. The Air Force has gone from expecting massive chemical strikes to 
anticipating more solitary chemical attacks. It has also changed from threat -based to capability-
based forces. Finally, it has taken advantage of the advancing knowledge in fate of agents. The 
combination of these three factors results in a passive defense approach that is one portion of a 
larger Air Force and Department of Defense strategy for countering chemical weapons. This 
approach calls for greater attention being paid to chemical defenses prior to an attack and faster 
reconstitution of operating capacity after an attack.  
The C-CW CONOPS differs significantly from past operations, which were designed with a 
different threat in mind. Assuming a fight in the Fulda Gap under a continuous onslaught of CW-
tipped artillery called for a different strategy than operating in a theater where an enemy launches 
a few SCUD missiles in an attempt to disrupt operations. In addition to addressing the challenges 
of a different threat environment, the C-CW CONOPS also reflects a different attitude about 
fighting in a chemical environment. Completely stopping the operational mission to handle the 
chemical environment is no longer acceptable. The Air Force’s warfighting strategy is different 
from before because it concentrates on the mission rather than the environment.  
Main Assumptions of the C-CW CONOPS 
The C-CW CONOPS makes three main assumptions about droplet size, vapor hazard, and liquid 
hazard, and these are the root of the controversy. Some planners, especially army chemical 
warfare specialists, believe that the Air Force based its assumptions on flimsy science, and the 
new doctrine will lead to greater danger for military personnel. The Air Force counters with 
studies showing the validity of its arguments.  
The first assumption concerns droplet size. There are many different delivery methods for 
chemical weapons, including spray tanks, artillery shells, aerial bombs, missiles, rockets, 
unmanned aerial vehicles, cruise missiles, and grenades. According to the U.S. Congress Office 
of Technology Assessment, “chemical munitions are designed to convert a bulk payload of liquid 
or powdered agent into an aerosol of microscopic droplets or particles that can be readily 
absorbed by the lungs, or a spray of relatively large droplets that can be absorbed by the skin.”[7] 
A spray can be generated by a spray tank carried by a helicopter or aircraft, while an aerosol can 
be generated by any of the munitions. The assumption of the C-CW CONOPS is that the most 
likely delivery method to pose a threat to an airbase is a supersonic tactical ballistic missile 
(TBM), and the most effective fusing is an air burst. This type of delivery generates a fine aerosol 
that produces a higher agent vapor concentration than larger droplets, but the vapor dissipates 
more rapidly.[8]  
To obtain the maximum dispersal for a CW agent, a ballistic missile needs to employ an air burst 
rather than a ground burst. According to Air Force Manual 10-2602, a ground burst limits the 
dispersal and effectiveness of the agent: “Ground burst warheads with chemical and biological 
agents create the greatest hazard within the immediate area surrounding the impact point. Most 
of the agent effectiveness will be lost from the force of warhead impact.”[9] On the other hand, an 
air burst provides better results: “Airburst warheads provide the most effective area coverage and 
dispersion pattern for chemical and biological agents.”[10] Only VX can survive an airburst, 
however, in militarily significant amounts. G-series agents are more volatile, and can therefore 
best be delivered in a ground burst. The C-CW CONOPS concludes that VX delivered by TBM is 
thus the most likely threat to air base operations.  
The result of an optimal air burst is a cloud of vapor that falls to the ground downwind of the 
delivery. AFMAN 10-2602 summarizes the process: “If an agent, such as VX, is released at an 
optimal burst height of about 250 meters (about 800 feet) above ground level, the agent falls to 
the ground over the next 60 minutes in the downwind direction of the prevailing wind. The 
average size of the VX liquid droplets that reach the ground from such an attack are expected to 
be about 200 to 250 microns, or about the thickness of four sheets of paper.”[11] This type of 
delivery is very different from the old assumptions used in CW planning, and the results led to an 
examination of the tables used to estimate agent persistence. This examination led to the next 
two assumptions.  
The second and third assumptions concern the duration of the liquid hazard on surfaces found at 
a typical airbase and the duration of the vapor hazard. In the past, planners assumed that the 
hazard from CW agents would persist for days or weeks. This belief was widespread, although 
not entirely consistent. From the 1956 Army and Air Force Manual, Military Chemistry and 
Chemical Agents, Tabun (GA) and Soman (GD), nerve gases developed before VX, had the 
following characteristics: “Persistency effect. Depends on munition used, weather, etc. Heavily 
splashed liquid persists 1-2 days under average weather conditions.”[12] The other nerve agent 
of the time, Sarin (GB), “evaporates at approximately the same rate as water.”[13] Unstated was 
the assumption that however the agent was delivered, it would remain in a condition where it 
could be a “heavily splashed liquid.” A 1952 Navy publication, Chemical and Biological Warfare 
Defense, stated, “GB is the least persistent (about 12 hours under ordinary conditions); the others 
[GA and GD] have a persistency of more than 12 hours under similar conditions.”[14] Even 
current U.S. Army guidance is not entirely consistent, with different field manuals giving different 
lengths of vapor hazard present for the same agent. Despite the inconsistencies, Army manuals 
generally agree that chemical agents such as Sarin, Soman, and Mustard gas present a vapor 
hazard for one to ten hours, and VX for 241 to 1776 hours (ten to seventy-four days).  
The Army tables to determine chemical agent persistence were a problem for Air Force planners 
for two reasons. First, the tables do not distinguish between a liquid hazard and a vapor hazard, 
and they mention only duration of vapor hazards. Second, the tables give figures only for CARC 
(chemical agent resistant coating) painted surfaces, with multipliers given for grassy and sandy 
terrain. No data is given for surfaces most commonly found at air bases—concrete and asphalt.  
Three different studies have filled in these gaps in the data. Tests at the Dugway Testing Center, 
Naval Surface Warfare Center, and in the Czech Republic have gone a long way in answering the 
questions pertinent to Air Force planners. The Dugway tests took concrete and asphalt samples 
from thirteen different runways and piers to test with VX. The Naval Surface Warfare Center 
tested three CW agents on six materials commonly found in a military environment: expeditionary 
airfield landing mats, non-skid coating used on aircraft carrier flight decks, non-skid coating used 
on other surface ships, topcoat paint used on Navy and Air Force rotary and fixed-wing aircraft, 
tent material, and concrete. The tests in the Czech Republic focused on the evaporation rate of 
CW agents on fixed site materials, such as grass, sand, asphalt, and concrete.  
The results from these three tests for VX, previously thought to be extremely persistent, are 
consistent with each other but completely inconsistent with the Army field manual tables. The 
tests show that very little VX actually evaporates, especially from concrete. The VX sorbs into the 
concrete and is virtually impossible to remove from it.[15] Rich McNally, an expert in CW agents, 
analyzed the findings from the studies. He wrote that the Dugway test showed “current models 
greatly overestimate the rate and amount of V-agent evaporation from concrete.”[16] He 
continued, writing that in the Naval Surface Warfare Center test, “concrete showed exceptional 
sorbative capability of all agents tested, resulting in very low evaporation of chemical agents and 
very low surface liquid chemical agents.”[17] Finally, about the Czech tests, he wrote, “Czech 
extraction results show significant breakdown of VX and GD on concrete surfaces; [tests] 
measured cumulative VX vapor from concrete significantly lower than models predicted.”[18] His 
conclusion, and the position adopted by the Air Force, was that the tests showed that VX does 
not pose the extended threat reflected by Army field manuals.  
The Air Force used the data obtained from these tests to make its assumptions about liquid and 
vapor hazard. The liquid hazard is thought to be less than ten minutes on concrete, up to four 
hours on grass, up to six hours on painted surfaces, and hours to weeks on unpainted metals and 
glass. Table 1 is a summary of the liquid hazard data:  
Surface Time in Hours  
Asphalt 
<10 minutes for neat agent  
tens of minutes for thickened agent  
Grass, sand, soil A few minutes up to 4 hours 
Painted surfaces 
Up to 1 hours on most surfaces  
As long as 6 hours on some paints 
Unpainted metal or glass Hours to weeks 
Table 1: Chemical Agent Liquid Hazard  
The vapor hazard, although not quantified as well as the liquid hazard, is nonetheless 
characterized as not as long lasting as previously thought. The C-CW CONOPS states, “V-class 
agents, the only chemical agents likely to survive a SCUD airburst, are non-volatile. When sorbed 
into surfaces, they present vapor levels that are lower and shorter in duration than predicted in 
current models that assume all the agent remains on the surface until evaporated.”[19] H and G 
series agents are also assumed to present a lower vapor hazard than previously thought.  
The three assumptions combine to paint a post-attack picture very different from the standard 
Cold War scenario. Instead of an attack that covers the entire base with a layer of dripping, 
persistent chemicals, the new picture is an attack with a small number of air burst ballistic 
missiles depositing a chemical vapor cloud over a limited portion of a base. The post-attack 
environment, while potentially lethal, is not an insurmountable obstacle to combat operations.  
Operational Implications of the New Assumptions  
An analysis of these assumptions led the Air Force to three operational implications. First, a 
chemical attack will likely result in less widespread contamination with a shorter hazard duration. 
Second, the combination of the sorbative qualities of many airfield surfaces and the low sensitivity 
of currently fielded liquid and vapor detectors means that contamination may be difficult to 
determine. Third, after chemical agents sorb into porous surfaces, they do not present a liquid 
pick-up or transfer hazard. As a result, equipment and personnel can move from a contaminated 
area to a clean area without the risk of spreading the contamination on tires or feet.  
The implication of a more limited hazard profoundly changes the operational mindset. Instead of 
assuming that an entire airbase would have to operate in MOPP 4 for days or weeks because 
everything is contaminated, a geographically limited hazard means that part of the base will be 
contaminated, but part will not. After an initial period to determine the extent of the contamination, 
portions of a base can return to a lower MOPP level sooner and restore operations quicker. More 
thought and effort must be given, therefore, to plan out a detection and communication system to 
give commanders the information they need to make timely and accurate MOPP level decisions. 
The required contamination reporting puts increased emphasis on the base command and control 
system, along with putting more pressure on commanders to weigh the risks properly. Air base 
planners also have an increased responsibility to create an effective sectoring strategy for 
dividing the base that takes into account potential threats, local wind and weather patterns, and 
operational patterns.  
Currently fielded CW detection equipment presents another challenge, which folds into the 
second operational implication. The postulated worst case delivery method, a VX air burst of a 
TBM, creates a vapor and liquid hazard that poses a detection problem. Chemical agents sorb 
quickly into concrete and asphalt, but still present a low level vapor hazard. This means that after 
an attack, an airman may be unable to detect a liquid hazard with M8 or M9 paper, because the 
agent would already be sorbed into the concrete, but a vapor hazard may still be present for an 
hour. The C-CW CONOPS states, “The lack of liquid and vapor detectors sensitive enough to 
detect low volatility agents makes it difficult to detect the presence of some anticipated threat 
agents. Once the agent has sorbed into the surface, low-levels of vapor will remain which could 
pose a risk to unprotected personnel. The duration of potential low-level vapor hazards will vary 
with different agent/surface combinations.”[20] Understanding that the absence of detection does 
not equate to absence of agent is critical for a commander who will make MOPP level decisions.  
The final operational implication of the characteristics of chemical agents on airfield surfaces is 
that once a chemical agent sorbs into concrete or asphalt, it no longer presents a liquid or pick-up 
hazard. When a sectoring plan is in place to segregate contaminated areas from clean areas, this 
characteristic means that equipment and personnel can move from a contaminated area to a 
clean area without spreading the contamination. Equipment and personnel are thus not restricted 
to working only in a contaminated area, meaning that the flexibility may exist to recover critical 
assets to restore combat operations.  
From these assumptions and operational implications, the Air Force developed the C-CW 
CONOPS, which calls for “new approaches for operating in a chemical environment.”[21] These 
new approaches include the following six main elements:  
· Contamination avoidance;  
· Detailed operational effectiveness assessments;  
· Mixed/split MOPP operations;  
· Commander involvement and risk management;  
· Cross-functional and base-wide involvement;  
· Protection of personnel and marking and identifying contaminated areas and surfaces.  
Applying each of the elements is necessary for proper execution, because the C-CW CONOPS 
demands active participation from all base units and organizations. Attempting to restore 
operations as quickly as possible makes the system more complicated and more reliant on 
effective command and control at all levels.  
Applying the C-CW CONOPS  
The easiest way to understand how the C-CW CONOPS changes operations is to take a 
chronological approach, looking at pre-attack, trans-attack, and post-attack periods. Pre-attack 
includes both the planning phase and the operational phase prior to an attack. Post-attack 
includes both immediate actions and the longer-term effort to restore operations.  
1. Pre-attack Planning 
Under previous plans, pre-attack planning was generally limited to training of personnel, 
acquisition of equipment, and identification of shelters. In 1952, Navy training was generally 
broken into principles of CW agents and attacks, CW defense including individual and collective 
protection, and decontamination.[22] By the late 1990s, Air Force training had not advanced 
significantly, with most training of airmen coming from Air Force Handbook 32-4014, Ability to 
Survive and Operate Procedures in a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environment, 
which concentrated on the same areas.[23] The greatest emphasis of the training was on 
individual survival, especially individual protective equipment (IPE). The next most important 
training area was decontamination. The emphasis on these two areas reflects the belief that 
contamination was unavoidable, and survival was the primary goal with the mission happening 
some time in the future. The May 1991 GAO report, Chemical Warfare: Soldiers Inadequately 
Equipped and Trained to Conduct Chemical Operations, stated, “unit commanders… continue to 
view chemical defense as a separate task rather than as a condition of combat.”[24] Air Force 
thinking followed along those same Army lines. CW was a task unto itself, and once the CW 
portion was over, then a unit could get back to the real combat operation. The training reflected 
the general understanding of the situation.  
The pre-attack phase of the C-CW CONOPS reflects the belief that contamination will be limited 
and thus can be avoided. The planning phase focuses on two areas, contamination avoidance 
and hazard reporting. A vulnerability assessment is the first step for commanders to determine 
what assets are required to accomplish the mission, which assets need protection, and what 
protection means are available. This first step shows that mission accomplishment is the primary 
goal, regardless of environment. The ability to survive in that environment is a given. Part of the 
vulnerability assessment, therefore, is an assessment of the availability of IPE equipment. Also 
included in the assessment is determining the unit’s decontamination capability, since lack of an 
ability to decontaminate certain assets may drive specific contamination avoidance measures.  
The next portion of the planning phase is the development of a detection network. This 
development includes dividing the base into sectors, assigning hazard monitoring responsibilities, 
training post-attack reconnaissance (PAR) teams, and establishing reporting procedures to the 
wing operations center. Dividing the base into sectors can be done along organizational or 
functional lines, and bases can be divided into a few or into many sectors. Each strategy has its 
strengths and weaknesses, so base-wide involvement is necessary to create a plan that will work 
for the most units. Where sector lines are drawn can determine which units have hazard reporting 
responsibilities, which in itself is not a problem. The challenge is ensuring that the entire base is 
properly monitored for hazards. Once units know their area of responsibility, they can determine 
how many PAR teams to train. Once units know what reporting procedures to follow, they can 
train and practice those procedures.  
Along with the big picture planning for contamination avoidance and hazard reporting, units still 
need to accomplish individual training. The entire plan assumes that individuals understand how 
to wear and use their IPE gear correctly, but the training must also include the basic elements of 
the C-CW CONOPS. When individuals understand the importance of each of the concepts, the 
plan should function properly.  
2. Trans-attack Phase  
The trans-attack phase highlights another difference between the old methods and the C-CW 
CONOPS. When under attack, the old plan had people abandon vehicles and dive into ditches. 
Since every part of the base was going to receive its share of chemical agent, this strategy 
provided the most protection from blast and fragment hazards but ignored contamination risks. 
The C-CW CONOPS emphasizes continued adherence to the idea of contamination avoidance, 
stating the personnel will, “finish final contamination avoidance tasks when notified of an air or 
missile attack; seek overhead cover with splinter protection; and don protective equipment.”[25] 
AFMAN 10-2602 list alternatives to consider before diving into a ditch: “Actions for Personnel in 
Open Areas. When the attack warning sounds (or notification is received) individuals in open 
areas should seek the best available protection (building, bunker). Ideally, this protection should 
be within 200 feet and provide overhead cover. If such protection is unavailable, move to a ditch, 
depression, or structure that provides protection from blast, fragments, and small arms fire.”[26] 
In the past, running 200 feet to a building would have been considered dangerous; now, 
remaining unprotected from contamination is dangerous.  
3. Post-attack Phase  
The post-attack phase is the most dramatic departure from the old system. Previously, after an 
attack, the entire base would remain in MOPP 4 indefinitely, and operations would begin with the 
decontamination process. Pilots returning from sorties would process through the 
decontamination line in life support, eventually emerging at the other end, ready to enter the 
clean, over-pressured squadron building. Contamination of equipment was assumed, and many 
resources were dedicated to decontaminating equipment to return it to service. The attitude was 
similar to the Army way of thinking—fighting the chemical agents was the war, and the enemy 
had to wait until the Air Force was done deconning. Under this system, a degradation of sortie 
production was part of the cost of doing business in a CW environment.  
The C-CW CONOPS does not accept this level of degradation. After an attack, airfield damage 
assessment teams (ADAT) and PAR teams identify and report the hazard while the majority of 
base personnel remain protected during the initial phases of chemical agent deposition. The 
detector network delivers information from the PAR teams around the base to the commander. 
The commander then makes mission versus risk decisions in implementing MOPP levels in 
different sectors. With an overriding concern for personnel safety, the focus is nonetheless on the 
mission. Non-contaminated sectors return to operating in MOPP 2. In contaminated areas, 
personnel wear MOPP 4, and they begin operating again. If contamination avoidance procedures 
have been successful, some equipment may not have been contaminated and can be transferred 
to clean sectors. Mission critical items can be decontaminated to an operational level and placed 
back into service. AFMAN 10-2602 states the intention of these efforts: “decontamination 
operations are intended to help sustain or enhance military operations in NBC environments by 
preventing or minimizing mission performance degradation, casualties, or loss of resources.”[27] 
The goal is not winning a war against chemical agents; the goal is getting back to the mission.  
The difference between the two methods of operating in a CW environment comes from the 
difference in understanding of that environment. In the past, there was no reason to discuss 
contamination avoidance, since chemical agents would be dripping from every surface. In that 
environment, sustaining any type of operation took much more effort than normal operations. The 
aim was just to operate at all, and hope that the enemy was having just as difficult a time coping 
with the environment. Today, however, a different view of the CW environment leads to a different 
outlook. Contamination can be avoided. Operations can be restored.  
Conclusion  
U.S. military thinking about chemical weapons has advanced significantly in the past twelve 
years. In 1992, the National Military Strategy of the United States did not mention chemical 
warfare at all, referring to WMD only in terms of stopping proliferation.[28] The fall of the Soviet 
Union had eliminated the possibility of fighting in a chemical environment. New threats emerged, 
however, in the form of chemical weapons used as an asymmetric method of countering 
conventional superiority. By October 1993, the Department of Defense began trumpeting the 
need to have the capability to carry out operations in the face of a chemical attack.  
The change in threat environment eventually led to a change in the understanding of what 
capabilities the military would require. In the past, planners thought the most likely place to 
encounter chemical warfare was in a large-scale conflict with the Soviet Union. The plans 
reflected the thinking that the Soviets would use their large stockpile of chemical weapons to 
saturate U.S. equipment and troops. Any small chemical attack would be just a precursor to the 
larger attack.  
This type of thinking changed after the fall of the Soviet Union and Operation DESERT STORM. 
U.S. forces now had conventional superiority, and if enemies had chemical weapons, their 
stockpiles were small. The greatest threat of chemical attack was from limited missile attacks. 
While these attacks would result in smaller areas of contamination, U.S. commanders still had 
only one all-or-nothing response available for base protection. The plan, which made sense while 
planning to fight the Soviets, was overkill when fighting a less capable enemy. The all-or-nothing 
plan also degraded combat capability by decreasing sortie-generation rates. Commanders 
needed a more flexible set of tools.  
The C-CW CONOPS emerged from this need for more flexibility. By examining the assumptions 
of fighting in a chemical environment, planners discovered that limited attacks could have 
significantly less lasting impact on operations. By modifying operations, commanders could 
preserve their current combat capability while protecting their people. No longer would an entire 
base operate under MOPP 4 conditions for extended periods. Commanders received the 
capability to counter a finite threat with a finite response.  
This mission focus is central to the C-CW CONOPS. The plan emphasizes restoring combat 
capability as quickly as possible, with an emphasis on pre-attack planning. Commanders conduct 
operational effectiveness assessments to determine critical assets, and then plan how to prevent 
contamination of those assets. Because of the limitations imposed by currently fielded chemical 
agent detectors, units need to develop detailed plans for placement and checking of detectors. 
Units also need to develop a notification system to consolidate information from various part of 
the base. Commanders then make risk management decisions based on the information received 
from the field. Although the system is much more complex than the former single level of 
response, it does allow units to get back into the fight quicker. 
The C-CW CONOPS offers a new way of addressing the problem of operating a fixed base in a 
CW environment, based on a particular understanding of the operational environment. One key to 
applying the C-CW CONOPS successfully is adopting a new mindset for countering a chemical 
attack. The old mindset was to protect future combat power by protecting lives. The new mindset 
is to protect current combat capability through prudent risk management. This new perspective 
allows commanders to focus on the mission, rather than merely the environment—solutions, 
rather than problems.  
The C-CW CONOPS is a good change in mindset for the Air Force, and the other services should 
examine the work the Air Force has done to see how it can help their own fixed-base operations. 
Adopting a common set of operational standards for fixed base operations will simplify equipment 
procurement and personnel training while it enhances combat capability. When the other services 
challenge their Cold War assumptions about CW, they will discover the Air Force C-CW 
CONOPS as much to offer.  
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. 
To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox at the beginning of each 
month, email ccc@nps.edu with subject line "Subscribe". There is no charge, and your 
address will be used for no other purpose. 
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